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ABSTRACT
Background: Pharmaceutical fraud can be very profitable. Those working in pharmaceuticals are in a tempting
position as the nature of the product and supply is complex, making detection of fraud difficult and expensive.
However, a reliable pharmaceutical supply can often be a life-or-death situation for patients. Thus, when detection of
fraud occurs, a Regulator's Dilemma often emerges (recall a drug for which a supplier is the sole source, or allow a
substandard product to be sold)—generally resulting in pharmaceutical companies receiving minimal penalties even
for the worst acts. Despite pharmaceutical companies' unique leverage over regulators and profitability, studies are
rare in the scientific literature regarding pharmaceutical fraud.
Purpose: The primary aim of this article is to increase awareness of the various types of pharmaceutical frauds. In
addition, the secondary objective is to provide insight into the influence economics possesses in motivating
pharmaceutical fraud.
Method: Case studies and examples of pharmaceutical fraud are described. Reviewed case studies include purchasing and
distribution of products from unlicensed sellers, unlawful promotion of Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia, and concealing
bladder cancer risk associated with pioglitazone. Economic information is gathered through mining the US Department of
Labor Statistics, Govinfo, US Securities and Exchange Commission, companies annual reports, and US Department of
Justice databases. Economic screenshots are used to summarize the frauds surrounding economics both within and external
to the companies.
Results: Purchasing and distribution of products from unlicensed sellers occurred between December 2006 to August 2009
and took place solely in the US. Economic snapshots of this time show that the US was in an economic recession. During
this time raw material costs were high and the pharmaceutical industry was experiencing major lay-offs. The scheme resulted
in the company grossing over $50 million-dollar in added proceeds.
The unlawful promotion of Paxil, Wellbutrin, Avandia, Avair and others occurred between 1998 to 2010 on a global scale.
The economic snapshot of this time shows the company faced patent expiration of several highly profitable patents during
this period, starting in 1997 with Zantac’s expiry and then with the loss of Augmentin in 2002, several years before its patent
expiration of 2018. Avandia lost market exclusivity in 2008 and Advair lost market exclusivity in 2010. The company also
faced several regulatory challenges. In addition, more than one economic recession occurred during this time including the
Asian and US markets. Finally, the concealment of cancer risks with pioglitazone occurred from the approval of the drug in
1999 to the settlement in 2015. Between 1995-1999 the company was growing and had launched several worldwide
ventures. In addition to expanding, the company faced regulatory black-box challenges as well as encountering recessions in
the US.
Conclusions: History suggests that monetary incentives are motivators in unethical behavior and fraud cases. Economic
recessions, patent expirations, and company expansion are among the most consistent economic pressures surrounding the
cases studied, suggesting these variables may be predictors of potential drug quality issues.
Keywords: fraud incentive, pharmaceutical fraud, economics of fraud, deception, concealment

◆

ISSN: 1547-8890

Contact
in Context

Pharmaceutical Sciences

2
Campbell

1

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Ritonavir was approved to market as a
protease inhibitor (“Ritonavir, Abbott protease inhibitor,
approved.,” 1996). By 1998 Abbott Laboratories was facing a
potential financial crisis as a less soluble polymorph (Form II)
of Ritonavir was discovered (Bauer et al., 2001) forming
during the manufacturing process of Ritonavir. The detection
of Form II resulted in a temporary halt in Ritonavir sales. In
addition to the loss in sales and “ticking clock on” patent life,
Abbott Laboratories also faced additional development costs
(Aldridge, 2007; Bauer et al., 2001). Abbott Laboratories
scientists ultimately found methods to avoid the polymorph
formation, and Ritonavir was returned to market.
Nevertheless, Abbott faced a significant financial burden due
to this unexpected event.
Ritonavir’s unforeseen polymorphic change is an
example of the complexities and risk involved in
pharmaceutical development. Analytical techniques such as
Raman spectrometry, solid-state nuclear magnetic resonance,
and x-ray diffraction are used to identify polymorphs before a
drug is approved (Bauer et al., 2001). In addition,
computational modeling is achieving some success in
predicting polymorphs early in the development process
(Piaggi and Parrinello, 2018). However, these techniques can
only be helpful if the parties involved are honest. This seems
to be the case with Abbott Laboratories’ and Ritonavir.
Unfortunately, companies (humans) are not always honest in
stressful scenarios. Honesty is potentially expensive in terms
of time and money, possibly incentivizing humans to decide
on a dishonest, unethical, or fraudulent path.
When companies face difficult choices, the humans
leading those companies must decide to act ethically or
unethically. When a dishonest path is chosen, fraud is the
result. Fraud can be described as an intentionally deceitful
action intended to provide dishonest gain (Chen and James,
2021). Criminology tells us that in order to effectively detect
fraud, pursuers must know why it’s committed (Kassem and
Higson, 2012). The Fraud Triangle Theory of criminologist
Donald R. Cressey shines a light on this topic. Cressey
theorized that for fraud to occur, three elements must be
present: incentive, opportunity and rationalization (Cressey,
1973). Examining the pharmaceutical industry through the
fraud triangle, we see an ideal environment for fraud emerge.
Incentive: The pharmaceutical industry’s 2006 global sales
totaled approximately $634 billion. This value is almost
double the 2001 global sales of $387 billion (OECD, 2008).
ISSN: 1547-8890

In 2010, counterfeit drugs (defined below) were worth an
estimated $75 billion. Moreover, the profit margins for
counterfeits are reported higher than illicit drug trafficking
(Chambliss et al., 2012). For example, counterfeit sildenafil
(Viagra) is estimated to be nearly ten times more profitable
than street heroin (Everts, 2010), and nearly 2000 times more
profitable than selling cocaine (Bingham, 2009). Providing
plenty of monetary incentives for criminals. Indeed, actual
criminals bypassing regulation and supply expenses, may gain
3000% increased profit margins than those who don’t
(Blackstone et al., 2014).
Opportunity: The globalization of the pharmaceutical industry
has added complexity to the pharmaceutical development
process and supply-chain (Luis Valverde, 2016). Further, the
nature of the products is complex. Often requiring specialized
equipment to detect contaminants (Campbell and Lodder,
2021). Collectively the complexity from the products and
supply-chain makes detecting counterfeit, adulterated, and
misbranded medicine (CAMM) difficult. Hence, providing a
low-risk, high-opportunity environment for fraud.
Rationalization: Pharmaceuticals are sensitive in nature,
which means life or death for many patients. This sensitivity
may provide bad actors with the feeling they are doing good
by providing vital products. Even if a few corners are cut, the
important thing is the customer gets their drugs, right?
Further, a unique relationship with regulators exists. Possibly
allowing bad actors to rationalize avoiding penalties for their
actions. For example, imagine a company producing an
angiotensin II receptor blocker such as Valsartan is cited for
policy incompliance. Regulators are then trapped in a
regulator's dilemma. Shut the facility down until the violation
is corrected. Therefore, risking a drug shortage in which
thousands of patients could suffer (Jackevicius et al., 2020).
Or allow the facility to continue producing the product with
an agreement that the facility will fix the problem moving
forward. With the latter option the most typical choice, the
regulators are left having to rely on good faith alone.
Allowing room for bad actors to easily rationalize penalty
avoidance even if detection were to occur. Of course, this
example is simplified. Indeed, regulator's dilemmas can be
highly complex (Schilsky, 2018). Yet, the point remains.
Pharmaceutical suppliers have a unique advantage over
regulators. Hence, the sensitive nature of pharmaceuticals
provides an environment for fraudsters to rationalize their bad
actions.
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Satisfying each element of the fraud triangle the
pharmaceutical industry provides an ideal environment for
fraud to manifest. Pharmaceutical fraud is overarching and
often refers to several unethical or dishonest acts. Indeed, it is
not easy to define and has yet to find a universal definition.
Health drug frauds, which are drug products that claim to treat
disease or improve health with unproven effectiveness (FDA,
2016). And current good manufacturing practice (cGMP)
incompliance in which pharmaceutical manufacturers
knowingly (or unknowingly-this aspect being somewhat
irrelevant as it is their legal responsibility to know) distribute
low-quality products or fail to take the actions required to
ensure quality (Rovira and Espín, 2009) are but two examples
of what may be termed pharmaceutical fraud. To further
complicate the ambiguous terminology, pharmaceutical
counterfeiting, a common pharmaceutical crime, has found
several definitions. For example, the world health
organization (WHO) defined counterfeit medication as "one
which is deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect
to identity and/or source. Counterfeiting can apply to both
branded and generic products and, counterfeit products may
include products with the correct ingredients or with the
wrong ingredients, without active ingredients, with
insufficient active ingredients or with fake packaging."(WHO,
1999).While the FDA has simply referred to counterfeit drugs
as "fake medicine" that may be harmful to one's health (FDA,
2011a). Further, WHO's attempts to update their definition
have provided more confusion. Leading authors to often
revert to the 1999 definition (Acri, 2018; Deisingh, 2005).
Keen readers may have already noticed the overlaps in the
WHO's 1999 definition of pharmaceutical counterfeits and the
FDA's 2016 definition of health drug frauds. Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this article, pharmaceutical fraud will be
loosely defined as any intentionally deceitful action intended
to provide dishonest gain through or related to
pharmaceuticals and will be used to describe the actions
which result in CAMMs. And unfortunately, CAMMs are a
growing problem.
Pharmaceutical fraud is a growing issue. Indeed,
WHO estimates that nearly 10% of the global pharmaceutical
trade is counterfeit (Williams and McKnight, 2014). Further,
counterfeits are no longer just an issue in developing regions
of the world but a global concern (Wertheimer et al., 2003). In
2012, it was estimated that approximately 1% of drugs in the
US were counterfeit, with an expected increase to occur
annually (Chambliss et al., 2012). Though 1% seems
negligible, Chambliss points out that if a pharmacy distributes
ISSN: 1547-8890

200 prescriptions a day. Two may be counterfeit (Chambliss et
al., 2012). Recently, Valisure located in Connecticut reported
that nearly 10% of the drugs tested have been counterfeit,
adulterated, or misbranded (Valisure, 2021). Meaning out of
200 prescriptions 20 may be substandard. In other regions of
the world, counterfeit drugs can make up to nearly 50% of the
region's supply (Wertheimer et al., 2003; Williams and
McKnight, 2014). In 2011, 64% of anti-malaria drugs in
Nigeria were counterfeit (Blackstone et al., 2014). A quality
assessment study of 7 cardiovascular drugs in 10 sub-Saharan
countries found that of 1530 drugs tested, 249 were of poor
quality. With amlodipine having the highest prevalence with,
87 of 305 samples deemed substandard. The study concluded
that nearly 1 in 6 samples were counterfeit (Antignac et al.,
2017). Truly pharmaceutical frauds are not a victimless crime.
Indeed, reputable companies, partners, and patients are
victimized.
CAMMs are particularly damaging to the reputable
company. Indeed, piracy and counterfeits cost US companies
nearly $200 billion annually and cost 750,000 jobs
(Blackstone et al., 2014). Damages such as these have
motivated companies to join the fight against counterfeits. For
example, Pfizer’s partnership with law enforcement has
prevented approximately 226 million counterfeits from
reaching markets since 2004 (Pfizer, 2020). Additionally,
Medsaf, a vitamin turn medicine manufacturer, has partnered
with over 500 pharmacies and 100 hospitals to provide
genuine medication to regions across Nigeria (Adeshokan,
2018). Though a great start, even one CAMM can be
disastrous.
Pharmaceutical frauds can have catastrophic
consequences for patients. In 2008, heparin batches
possessing cheap contaminates in replacement of the API
reached consumers. This resulted in a national recall but came
too late for an estimated 83 patients who lost their lives
(Blackstone et al., 2014). Similarly, 120 hospital patients in
Pakistan lost their lives to contaminated Isotab. The isotab
was
reportedly
contaminated
with
anti-malarial
pyrimethamine causing rapid white blood cell depletion in its
victims (Arie, 2012). Reports claim that CAMM kill nearly
100,000 annually in sub-Saharan regions alone (Adeshokan,
2018). A number that continues to rise (Atabong, 2021).
Globally more than 500 children have died due to cough syrup
contaminated with ethylene glycol (Liang, 2006). Nearly
155,000 children die annually due to poor-quality
anti-malarial drugs (Nayyar et al., 2019).While 100,000
children's deaths occur annually due to poor quality
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pneumonia treatments (Sample, 2019). Making matters worse
pharmaceutical frauds may be harming patients in unforeseen
ways. Such as its contribution to antimicrobial resistance
(Nayyar et al., 2019). Clearly, pharmaceutical fraud is a
critical problem resulting in illness, loss of jobs, and loss of
life. A problem only exacerbated when legitimate companies
are involved. This topic will be covered through several case
studies. But first to gain a deeper understanding of the
problem, the next section provides several examples of
pharmaceutical frauds. This is followed by the case studies
section before concluding.
Examples
The remaining part of this section aims to briefly discuss
several examples of pharmaceutical fraud. Let us begin our
discussion with a fraud previously mentioned- counterfeiting.
Counterfeiting
As mentioned in the Introduction, counterfeiting has
found several definitions. Making matters worse, countries '
legal definitions of what makes a drug counterfeit remain
misaligned. Meaning what may be legal in one country is not
necessarily legal in another. A cause for concern in a
globalized supply chain. Nevertheless, for the sake of this
article, we will revert to the WHO’s 1999 definition. Which
was prompted after 771 reports of counterfeits were reported
between 1984-1999. With nearly 78% of these reports coming
from developing countries (Deisingh, 2005). Since then, the
number of counterfeit incidents have continued to increase in
developing countries. Indeed, the WHO estimates that 1 in 10
medical products in low to middle-income countries are
counterfeit (WHO, 2019). With the internet playing a key
role in the scale-up of counterfeits through means of falsified
pharmacies and delivery drug deals (O’Hagan and Garlington,
2018). Counterfeit drugs are a critical issue in more developed
countries as well.
In 2016, 1579 North Americans experienced seizures related
to taking counterfeit medicine (Acri, 2018). Further, North
America is facing an alarming increase of illegally trafficked
Fentanyl-laced counterfeits at the time of this writing (DEA,
2020). Fentanyl-laced drugs such as Oxycodone and Xanax
add to the growing number of overdoses and deaths related to
counterfeit medicine in the illegal drug markets (Castillo,
2021; Moss, 2021; US Department of Justice, 2020). Indeed,
counterfeit drugs can be dangerous. Further counterfeits can
also be damaging to the drug supply itself.
Beyond breeding an environment of mistrust.
ISSN: 1547-8890

Reputations of respectable manufacturers are on the line, as
well as brand integrity. Indeed, victims of counterfeit drugs
have filed lawsuits against the respectable company for not
safeguarding products against tampering (Deisingh, 2005).
CAMM’s sourced by reputable manufacturers make solving
the problem even more difficult. For example, researchers at
the University of Kentucky (UK) found that 2 of the 3
companies supplying Acetazolamide to the UK hospital were
contaminated and only contained 80-87% of the labeled API
amount (Chapin and Willett, 2021). Though the root cause of
this issue is still unknown, it may be speculated that the drug
product originally contained the labeled amount and degraded
over time. If this is the case, a cGMP incompliance may be to
blame as these batches of Acetazolamide should have never
reached the pharmacy. This leads to the next example-cGMP
incompliance.
cGMP incompliance
cGMP is a set of practices designed to ensure quality
in pharmaceutical manufacturing (Campbell and Lodder,
2021). GxP extends these practices to x=distribution, clinical,
laboratory, and other settings. cGMP and related GxP
practices are among the most violated pharmaceutical
guidelines (Rovira and Espín, 2009). Though most violations
are likely accidental and typically corrected before much harm
is done. Not all violations fall under the accidental category.
PharmaTech LLC for example, went through numerous
inspections and warnings yet still failed to correct cGMP
violations (FDA, 2012; Lalama et al., 2016). PharmaTech’s
inaction allowed for Burkholderia cepacia (BC)- an
opportunistic pathogen with the capacity to cause serve
respiratory illness- growth in the facility's water system
(Tavares et al., 2020). The same water was used to formulate
the company's over-the-counter (OTC) Dicto Liquid stool
softener (Lalama et al., 2016). After infecting several the FDA
called for a national recall (Kerr, 2017). Though the damage
was done, and PharmaTech would face a lawsuit for the death
of a 10-month-old infant. A case that PharmaTech settled in
2020 (Fischer, 2020).
Delaying Generics
Innovator drug companies facing patent expiration
may delay generic market entry by suing the generic
producers. By claiming allegations that the generic company
has infringed on the innovator’s patents. Innovators can delay
market entry by 30 or more months (Rovira and Espín, 2009).
Indeed, the most common delay of generic entry is patent
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litigation (Dave et al., 2020). Allowing the innovator to have
additional exclusivity on the market that more than
compensates for the legal cost of the trials (Feldman, 2017;
Rovira and Espín, 2009). Although this tactic is not
necessarily fraud, it is an example of gaming the Hatch
Waxman Act (Feldman, 2017) and is estimated to be costing
Medicaid millions (Dave et al., 2020). Additional methods for
delaying generics include refusal of product samples, which
are needed to prove bioequivalence (Feldman, 2017).
Price Hikes
Between 2009 to 2016, Mylan raised EpiPen prices by more
than 400% (Carrier and Minniti, 2017). Resulting in the
epinephrine delivering device costing over $600. When the
medicine itself only cost pennies per dose (Carrier and
Minniti, 2017; Glabau, 2017). Further, Mylan misclassified
EpiPen as a generic instead of a branded drug. Resulting in
Mylan paying lower rebates to the government (SEC, 2019).
In essence, withholding millions of rightly owed funds from
Medicaid. Mylan settled the violation against the False Claims
Act by agreeing to pay $465 million (US Department of
Justice, 2017). Additionally, Mylan refused to work with
government investigators throughout the investigation
process. Specifically failing to disclose or accrue for losses
relating to the investigation (SEC, 2019). This time Mylan
agreed to pay $30 million to settle the disclosure and
accounting failures (SEC, 2019). Mylan’s EpiPen prices are
not necessarily fraudulent; but they are arguably unethical as
they limit access to lifesaving medicine. Other examples of
price hiking are Daraprim’s 5000 percent increase by then
Turing Pharmaceuticals (Luthra, 2018) and Novartis’
one-time injection for spinal muscular atrophy that costs $2.1
million, Zolgensma (Lupkin, 2019). Even insulin has been
targeted with manufacturers facing recent lawsuits over
alleged price fixing (Anderson, 2020; Sagonowsky, 2019).
2

METHODS

The potential for monetary gain through unethical or
fraudulent acts is examined in four case studies. These
studies focus on legitimate companies that opted a
dishonest path. The studies include - purchasing and
distributing from unlicensed sellers, unlawful promotion of
Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia, and concealing knowledge
of cancerous risk data. Financial and economic information
is gathered through mining the US Department of Labor
Statistics, govinfo, US Securities and Exchange
Commission, and US Department of Justice databases.
ISSN: 1547-8890
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RESULTS

CAMM are a serious threat to the pharmaceutical
supply chain as they are difficult to detect and can by life
threatening. CAMMs become an even larger threat when they
are sourced through reputable companies. To shine light on
this topic and provide an understanding of the problem and its
respective monetary motivates this section examines the
economics and potential monetary gain surrounding four
cases
of
pharmaceutical
fraud. Examined cases
included-purchasing and distributing from unlicensed sellers,
unlawful promotion of Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia, and
concealing knowledge of cancerous risk data. For each case,
an economic screenshot is provided which summarizes
potential pressures, motivates, and goings-on during the time
of the event.
Purchasing and distributing from Unlicensed
Sellers
A unique scheme was developed by Cumberland
Dis- tribution, Inc., (“Cumberland”) a wholesale
prescription drug distributor licensed in Tennessee (TN).
The company knowingly bought prescription drugs from
unlicensed “street sellers” (Middle District of Tennessee,
2013). Purchasing took place in New York and Miami
through a network of individuals with legitimate
prescriptions. Drugs entangled in this scheme include drugs
used to treat immunodeficiency virus/ acquired
immunodeficiency
syndrome,
antipsychotic,
antidepressants, blood pressure, and diabetes (Middle
District of Tennessee, 2013; Roth, 2021a). The drugs were
then shipped to Cumberland’s warehouse located in
Nashville, TN. Here the drugs underwent cleaning,
organizing and repacking before being sold and distributed
to independent pharmacies. Those involved attempted to
evade authorities by setting up private emails, purchasing
burner phones, and renting another warehouse (Boling,
2018a). Red flags surrounding the Cumberland case
included a number of reports claiming drug bottles
contained the wrong medicine, incorrect labeling, and
foreign objects. Several reports claimed at least one bottle
contained tic tacs instead of medicine (Boling, 2018b).
The Cumberland’s economic screenshot surrounding this case
is:
● The crimes took place between December 2006 to
August 2009 (Middle District of Tennessee, 2013) in
Nashville, TN; Miami, Florida; and New York, New

Contact
in Context

Pharmaceutical Sciences

6
Campbell

York. During this time the US was facing an
economic recession in which over 8 million jobs
were lost (Barello, 2014). This may have given
individuals an incentive to sell their drugs cheaply
for extra cash. However, some studies suggest
American’s Pharmaceutical sales went up nearly
12% during the recession.
● Unemployment
rates peaked around 10%
(Cunningham, 2018).
● Pharmaceutical companies conducted large scale
lay-offs. For example, Pfizer laid off over 1,000
employees in 2009 (Buxton, 2019).
● Raw material import costs increased (Buysse, 2010).
The scheme resulted in the company grossing over $50
million-dollar in proceeds. Resulting in over $14 million
dollars in profit. Criminal charges were brought against
the company’s President and two co-workers.
Cumberland’s President was found guilty of Mail Fraud.
The president was made to forfeit $1.4 million and was
sentenced to six years in prison. Further, the court order
for restitution payments totaling $3,386.08 to two
pharmaceutical companies (Middle District of Tennessee,
2013).
Unlawful Promotion of Paxil, and Wellbutrin,
and Avandia
In 2012, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) pleaded guilty and
agreed to the largest pharmaceutical fraud settlement in US
history at the time (Office of Public Affairs, 2012). The
settlement was a result of GSK’s unlawful promotion of Paxil,
and Wellbutrin. Along with the failure to disclose clinical
safety data of the diabetes drug Avandia (District of
Massachusetts, 2012). Court documents reveal claims that
between January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2003, GSK
promoted off-label uses of Paxil. Between January 1, 1999, to
December 31, 2003, GSK knowingly promoted Wellbutrin for
off- label uses (e.g., weight loss and sexual dysfunction) and
at dosages other than those for which it was approved by the
FDA (Ortiz, 2012). Further claims made in the settlement
involved the asthma medication Advair being unlawfully
promoted between January 1, 2001, to June 30, 2010,
concerning dose. Lamictal between January 1, 1999, to
December 31, 2003, being promoted off-label. Zofran
between January 1, 2002, to December 31, 2004, being
promoted off-label. And a kickback scheme involving Praxil,
Wellbutrin, Advair, Imitrex, Lotronex, Flovent and Valtrex
(Ortiz, 2012).
ISSN: 1547-8890

Focusing solely on Paxil, Wellbutrin, and Avandia,
the economic gain of GSK’s actions was enormous. Though
difficult to separate the “honest” profit from dishonest profit,
one can gain an idea from looking at the sales during the years
covered by the settlement and the fine given. Here is a
screenshot of GSK sales during the settlement period.
●
Paxil brought in $11.6 billion in sales.
● Wellbutrin brought in $5.9 billion in sales.
●
Avandia brought in $10.4 billion in sales (Sifferlin,
2012).
● GSK agreed payout is as follows.
● GSK agreed to pay $1 billion in criminal penalties.
The $1 billion criminal fine was broken down as
follows.
o $159,768,000 for the unlawful promotion of
Paxil.
o $554,433,600 for the unlawful promotion of
Wellbutrin.
$43,185,600 criminal forfeiture for Paxil
o
and Wellbutrin.
o $242,612,800 criminal fine for Avandia.
●
GSK agreed to pay $2 billion in civil damages to
federal and state healthcare programs. The $2 billion
dollar fine for civil damages was broken down as
follows.
Federal Recovery: $1,501,618,568.
o
o State and Public Health Service (PHS)
recovery: $498,381,432 (Ortiz, 2012; US
Department of Justice, 2012).
● The GSK’S economic screenshot between 1997 to
2010 is:
● Zantac's market exclusivity was terminated in July
1997 (Bendt et al., 2002
● ). Until this date Zantac was bringing in the Glaxo
Wellcome company nearly $1.6 billion in U.S
revenue annually (Moore, 1997).
● Asian financial crisis began in 1997.
● The early 2000s recession covered approximately 1
year of the settlement range. Further, this recession
was noted for its general decline in exports. Along
with a decline in businesses investing in structures
and inventories (Kliesen, 2003).
● The US was facing the great recession in
approximately 2 (2007-2009) of the ~10-12 years
(1998-2010) covered by the case (Barello, 2014)
.This event may have contributed to the ~£1 billion
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●

●
●

●

drop in pharmaceutical US sales and subsequent drop
in profit in 2007 (See Figure 1 and 2).
Augmentin lost patent protection early in 2002 with
the patent meant to last until 2018. Augmentin was
GSK’s second largest drug in the year prior (Tesler,
2004).
Avandia lost market exclusivity in 2008.
Avandia experienced regulatory whiplash. In 2008,
the FDA mandated the medicine come with black
box
label
concerning
increased
ischemic
cardiovascular risk. This was later retracted in 2010.
There is some evidence that this may have influenced
patients taking it and hence sales (Hickson et al.,
2019).
Advair lost market exclusivity in 2010. However, the
FDA did not approve the first generic of Advair until
2019 (Meyer, 2019).

Figure. 1. Summarizes GSK’s total pharmaceutical sales (black
line), US pharmaceutical sales (blue line), and European
pharmaceutical sales (red line) between 1998-2010. Data gathered
from GSK’s annual in- vestor reports(GSK, 2010, 2009,, 2008, 2007,
2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000).

GSK faced numerous patent expiration and multiple
economic recessions during the time covered in the $3 billion
settlement. GSK also suffered multiple negative results in
clinical trials with drugs such as Praxil, lack of efficacy for
depression in patients under the age of 18 (Office of Public
Affairs, 2012). Further, generic introduction can cut nearly
90% of a company’s sales (DeRuiter, 2012). The numerous
losses of high-profit drugs during a short time with multiple
recessions and negative clinical results may have incentivized
the company’s dishonest actions. Nevertheless, the scheme
was brought to light by whistleblowers. Notably Thomas
Gerahty, a former senior marketing development manager for
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GSK, and Matthew Burke, a former regional vice president
for GSK (Kelton and Brown, 2011; Phillips & Cohen, 2012).
Concealing cancerous risk of pioglitazone
In 2015, Takeda Pharmaceutical agreed to pay a product
liability settlement of $2.37 billion (Casseres et al., 2020).
The settlement came approximately a year after Takeda and
partner Eli Lilly were ordered to pay $9 billion (75% paid by
Takeda and 25% paid by Lilly) for concealing knowledge of
pioglitazone (brand name Actos) bladder cancer risks. Though
the $9 billion quickly dwarfed to $36.8 million after appeals
(Grisham and Harding, 2015). Both cases originate from a
2011 lawsuit against Takeda by Terrence Allen and Susan
Allen. The allegations against Takeda were that Actos had
caused Terrence’s bladder cancer. However, Takeda argued
that “bladder cancer cannot occur within one year of exposure
to a causative agent” (Doherty, 2014). Despite this, the jury
awarded $1.475 million in compensation to the Allens
(Doherty and Magistrate Judge Hanna, 2014). Although the
Allens were not the first to accuse Takeda of concealing
knowledge they were the first to be successful in court
(Sullivan, 2018). Following the Allens’ success, numerous
lawsuits against Takeda with similar allegations cropped up.
Ultimately leading Takeda to its $2.37 billion settlement
agreement. Despite the settlement, multiple studies have
continued to conflict with the court’s decision that Actos is
associated with increased rates of bladder cancer (Lewis et al.,
2015; Tang et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the FDA backs the
position that pioglitazone does have the potential for
cancerous risks (FDA, 2011b).

Figure. 2. Summarizes GSK’s profit before taxation by year.
Data gathered from GSK’s annual investor reports (GSK, 2010,
2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000).
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In addition to potential bladder cancer risks, Actos also
carries a black-boxed warning. Stating the users of Actos are
at an increased risk of congestive heart failure. The warning
came alongside Avandia’s black box warning in 2007 (Tanne,
2007) .Unlike Avandia, Actos black-box label stuck. To gain a
deeper understanding of Takeda during this time, let us look at
an economic screenshot.
The economic screenshot of Takeda’s early years to roughly
2011 is:
● 1985 Takeda began globalizing via a joint venture
with
Abbott
Laboratories
through
TAP
Pharmaceuticals.
● 1985 TAP begins marketing Lupron.
● 1989 TAP releases Lupron Depot.
● 1991 Lansoprazole proton pump inhibitor launches
in Europe.
● 1995 Lansoprazole (brand name Prevacid) approved
in the US.
● Between 1995-1999 Takeda launched several
worldwide ventures including
○ Established Takeda UK in 1997.
○ Established Takeda Ireland in 1997.
○ Established a R&D and holdings group in
America in 1997.
○ Established Takeda America in 1998.
○ Established a European R&D center in 1998
(Takeda, 2021).
● Actos gained FDA approval in 1999.
● In 2001, TAP agreed to pay $875 million for
unlawful promotion of Lupron. This was one of the
earlier settlements against the False Claims Act in
the US (Girard, 2009).
● According to court documents Actos net sales
between 1999 and 2012 were $24 billion dollars
(Doherty, 2014).
● Novartis and TAP came to a licensing agreement for
Prevacid in 2005 (Japsen, 2005).
● Actos was the world’s top selling diabetes drug in
2007. This may have resulted from rival drug
Avandia’s link to heart attacks during the same time
(Turner et al., 2021).
● Novartis gained Prevacid OTC approval by the FDA
in 2009 (Novartis, 2010).
● Actos sales peaked at $3 billion in 2010 (Doherty,
2014).
● In 2011. Germany and France pulled Actos off the
ISSN: 1547-8890

market (Turner et al., 2021).
From the economic screenshot above, it seems that Actos
launched around the time Takeda was expanding. As an up
and coming company attempting to globalize, it would seem
natural to expect pressures for blockbuster developments such
as Actos to exist within the company. Assuming Takeda was
aware of the potential risks of Actos. The company may have
been incentivized to conceal this knowledge due to the
company undergoing a critical stage in its development.

4

DISCUSSION

The three case studies above provide context of the
links between monetary incentives and fraudulent acts. Such
behavior has contributed to the industry’s past reputation for
holding stakeholder opinions over patients (Kessel, 2014).
Though recently, the industry has had an improvement in
reputation. The 2019 PatientView survey showed that 46% of
patients surveyed viewed pharmaceutical companies as
excellent or good- a 5% increase from the year before (Wyke,
2020). Even generic companies saw an increase in reputation
from 34 to 35% (Wyke, 2020). But with nearly continuous
unethical behavior being uncovered through the FDA and
independent investigators such as Valisure and UK’s Quality
Study, will an improved reputation hold? It would seem
difficult as bad actors continue to target vital materials.
Lacking quality controls with Remdesivir processing (Almeter
et al., 2021), counterfeited COVID-19 vaccines (FDA, 2021),
and contaminated hand sanitizer with Benzene (Henderson,
2021) are just a few examples. It would not be surprising for
the entire healthcare sector to take a hit in reputation with
such acts. So comes the question- how do we combat
pharmaceutical fraud?
Many argue that in order to combat pharmaceutical
fraud, the penalty must be placed on corporate executives, and
it must be higher than the company simply writing a check.
Instead, criminal charges directly against CEOs and
executives resulting in prison sentences are suggested
(Waters, 2012). However, in the US, it is challenging to
convict company executives of pharmaceutical frauds. Even
the infamous former CEO of then Turing Pharmaceuticals,
Martin Shkreli (aka Pharma bro) was found guilty of security
frauds not necessarily pharmaceutical frauds (Gizzi and
Schmidt, 2017). Despite his alleged involvement with
Daraprim’s ongoing 5000% price hike (Siddons, 2021).
Conviction for pharmaceutical fraud is not impossible
though.
Insys Therapeutics founder John Kapoor and several
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executives were found guilty of illegal distribution of a
controlled substance (Dyer, 2019). The case made history as
the first time prosecutors had brought criminal Racketeer
Influenced, and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charges
against pharmaceutical executives (Ortyl, 2019). The
conviction sentenced John Kapoor to 66 months in the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons, followed by three years of
supervised release (Massachusetts, 2020). Executives
involved faced lesser time with the minimum possible prison
time given to Michael L. Babich, the former CEO of 2
months, but it could be as much as 30 months (Massachusetts,
2020). Additionally, the FDA took action against members
involved. Permanently debarring former Insys executive
Sunrise Lee from “providing services in any capacity to a
person that has an approved or pending drug product
application” (Roth, 2021b). Similar debarment notices were
given to others convicted, including John Kapoor (Roth,
2021c, 2020a, 2020b). Indeed it seems that Kapoor’s potential
for future monetary incentives to commit fraud was stripped.
However, it is yet to be seen if such punishments will
decrease corporate pharmaceutical frauds.

5

CONCLUSION

Several common examples of pharmaceutical fraud
have been presented. Including counterfeiting, cGMP
incompliance, and more. In addition, case studies have been
explored. Though each example and case studies vary in
detail, they all stay linked through the monetary incentives for
the actor. Assuming the companies involved in the case
studies were not caught, they would have made off with
billions of unjustly earned money. Findings suggest that
monetary incentives are common among unethical fraud
cases. Economic recessions, patent expirations, and company
expansion are amongst the most consistent economic factors
surrounding the cases studied. Suggesting these variables may
be predictors of potential drug quality issues.
It will be interesting to see how the industry’s
reputation holds up as more independent investigators join the
FDA in the fight against pharmaceutical crimes. As more and
more cases are uncovered, it seems there is a vital need for
reform, whether in policy or punishment. Otherwise, we can
expect more pharmaceutical fraud in our daily news
headlines.
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